Protecting the Standing of Renewal Site Families to Seek Review of Community Relocation Planning by unknown
PROTECTING THE STANDING OF RENEWAL SITE FAMILIES
TO SEEK REVIEW OF COMMUNITY RELOCATION PLANNING
IN the Housing Acts of 1949 1 and 1954,2 Congress made federal funds
available to communities attempting to attack urban decay.3 Title I, the core
of this legislation, deals with urban redevelopment and renewal.4 Localities
participating in the Title I program are urged to attack urban ills on several
fronts: clearance and redevelopment of slum areas, rehabilitation of blighted
neighborhoods, and conservation of existing sound neighborhoodsY Each of
these approaches involves the displacement of families living on renewal sites,
and Congress has conditioned the award of federal funds for Title I projects
on the existence of a community program to relocate displaced site families
in standard housing; under section 105 (c) of the 1949 Act, federal assistance
contracts must require that decent, safe, and sanitary housing be available for
all displaced families.6 Enforcement of this requirement is entrusted to the
Housing Administrator, the highest official of the Housing and Home Finance
1. 63 Stat. 413 (1949), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 3§ 1441-60 (Supp. IV, 1962).
2. 68 Stat. 590 (1954), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1446-60 (Supp. IV, 1962).
3. Federal grants are normally available on a 2-1 matching fund basis. 63 Stat. 416
(1949), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1453 (Supp. IV, 1962). In 1957, the Administrator was
authorized to extend aid on a 3-1 basis, in limited circumstances. 71 Stat. 299 (1957), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1453 (Supp. IV, 1962).
4. In the 1949 Act, Title I encompassed the clearance and rebuilding of slum areas
or redevelopment. 63 Stat. 414 (1949), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1451-60 (Supp. IV,
1962). The limitations of the clearance approach were soon noted. See, e.g., Slayton,
Urban Redevelopment Short of Clearance: Rehabilitation, Reconditioning, Conservation,
and Code Enforcement in Local Programs, in UB-A REDEVEpLm ET: PROBLEMS AND
PRAcrTCEs 313 (Woodbury ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as WOODBTJRY]. The renewal
concept, introduced in the 1954 act, encourages the use of a variety of planning tech-
niques.
5. The scope of the several renewal techniques is suggested in Johnstone, The
Federal Urban Renewal Program, 25 U. CH. L. Rxv. 301 n2 (1958). Professor John-.
stone's article is an informative general survey of the federal program.
6. 63 Stat. 416 (1949), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1958). Section 105(c) pro-
vides:
Contracts for loans or capital grants ... shall require that -.
(c) There be a feasible means for the temporary relocation of families displaced
from the urban renewal area, and that there are or are being provided, in the
urban renewal area or in other areas not generally less desirable in regard to
public utilities and public and commercial facilities and at rents or prices within
the financial means of the families displaced from the urban renewal area, decent,
safe, and sanitary dwellings equal in number to the number of and available to such
displaced families and reasonably accessible to their places of employment.
The statute requires only the relocation of families, and this Note is limited to problems
of family relocation. The local community may, of course, assist displaced businessmen
and individuals, and the statute permits the payment of moving expenses to such persons.
70 Stat. 1100 (1956), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1456(f) (Supp. IV, 1962). The impact of
renewal on neighborhood businessmen, and suggested ways to alleviate their burden, are
discussed in SPIEGEL, THE FORGOTTEN MAN IN HOUSING 48-51 (1959).
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Agency (HHFA).7 Under administrative regulations adopted by the HHFA
pursuant to section 105 (c), a community is deemed eligible for renewal funds
only when it has demonstrated the existence of both housing resources suffi-
cient to meet the needs of relocation and an organization to assist displaced
families through provision of referral and inspection services.8 By a network
of provisions, then, the federal law seeks to insure that communities take steps
to minimize the disruptive effects of renewal activity on site families.9
The community's task of relocation is not an easy one. More than 127,000
families had been displaced by renewal activity through 1961 ;1o and it was esti-
mated that one million more families would be displaced in the decade follow-
ing." This displacement is occurring at a time of serious national housing
shortage ;12 the resulting widespread blight-over 25 million Americans, it has
7. 68 Stat. 624 (1954), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (Supp. IV, 1962). The
Administrator may not delegate his responsibility to review relocation planning, his duty
to determine whether a community's workable program (see note 54 infra) is adequate,
or his authority to certify that the renewal community qualifies for federal assistance. His
other responsibilities in administering Title I may be delegated. 63 Stat. 417 (1949), 42
U.S.C. § 1456(a) (1) (1958). In 1954, the Administrator delegated all other urban re-
newal functions to the Urban Renewal Administration, under the general supervision of
a commissioner. HHFA Administrator's Reorganization Order No. 1, 19 Fed. Reg. 9303-
04 (1954).
8. This standard emerges from a study of the information required by the HHFA
to be submitted in documentation of the community's relocation planning. See generally
HHFA, URBAN RENEwAL MANUAL pt. 16, "Relocation" (1962). [The URBAN RENEVAL
MANUAL is hereinafter cited as HHFA, URM.] The submission requirements are ex-
amined infra. See notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
9. In reporting favorably on the 1949 Bill, the Senate Committee observed, under
the heading "Local Responsibility":
The Bill sets up adequate safeguards against any undue hardship resulting from
the undertaking of slum clearance under current conditions. It requires . . . that
no slum-clearance project shall be undertaken by a local public agency unless there
is a feasible means for the temporary relocation of the families to be displaced,
and unless adequate permanent housing is available or is being made available to
them.
S. REP. No. 84, to accompany S. 1070, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1949).
10. HHFA, RELOCATION raom URBAN RENmwAL PROJECT AREAS THROUGH: Dzcm -
am, 1961 9 (1962) [hereinafter cited as HHFA, REi.LOCAON DATA].
11. Estimate of William L. Slayton, Urban Renewal Commissioner, reported in
Relocation Revisions Released by URA, 19 J. HOUSING 248 (1962).
12. In 1949, the Senate Committee reported that the country should be prepared to
build or rehabilitate an average of 1,300,000 non-farm dwellings in each of the next 12
years (i.e. through 1961) if there was to be progress towards the goal of better housing
conditions for American, families. S. REP. No. 84, to accompany S. 1070, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1949). By 1960, the need, rather than, decreasing, had increased to a point where
construction of two million dwellings per year through 1970 was necessary to accom-
modate the increasing population and to replace exhausted units. Wurster, Framework
for an Urban Society, in PREsIDENT's CoM'N ON NATIONAL GOALS, GOALS FOR
AmERICANS 225 (1960). New York City had a housing deficit of 430,000 dwelling units
in 1958, yet the city's annual rate of construction was only 20,000 units. PANUCH, RE-
LOCATION IN NEW YORK CITY: SPECIAL REPORT TO MAYOR WAGNER 20 (1959).
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been estimated, are living in substandard housing l3 -has constricted the
supply of housing available for relocation purposes.14 The problem of relocat-
ing displacees is further complicated by the fact that a majority of them are
non-white families,15 to whom many housing sub-markets are closed. Perhaps
as a result of these difficulties, renewal communities' record on relocation thus
far is not entirely satisfactory. Between 1949 and 1961, almost 9,000 families
(seven per cent of the total) were relocated in substandard housing,1 6 while
another 17,500 families (fourteen per cent) had moved to unknown locations.'
7
The fact that more than twenty per cent of those displaced are not known to be
adequately relocated has prompted both commentators and renewal site fam-
ilies to express dissatisfaction with present relocation efforts.'5 Indeed, some
of those faced with displacement and relocation have turned to the courts in
an effort to insure their proper relocation. This Note is concerned with the
availability and scope of judicial review of such complainants' grievances.
In Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency,'9 site families brought a class action
to enjoin the award of Title I assistance to a renewal project on the ground
that the relocation plan was inadequate. They alleged that a housing shortage
existed, that the shortage would be aggravated by the renewal program, and
13. President John, F. Kennedy, State of the Union Message, Jan. 30, 1961. 1 U.S.
CODE CONrG. & AD. NEws 25, 29 (1961).
14. A shortage of housing is recognized as a principal cause of blight. When supply
and demand are balanced in the housing market, the dwelling needs of low and middle-
income families are met by a process of "filtering": older housing is released for their
use as higher income families move into new units. When this filtering process is blocked
by a housing shortage, families at the lower end of the economic scale are left to com-
pete for, and crowd into, whatever housing is available to them. See Johnstone, supra
note 5, at 350; Wurster, supra note 12, at 230, 235.
15. Of 86,000 displaced families for whom color was reported, 57,000 were non-white.
HHFA, RELOCATION DATA 8. Present patterns of relocation planning have been criticized
for promoting increased segregation, rather than producing integrated communities. CONN.
ADvISORY COMM. TO THE UNITED STATES Comm'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON CONN.:
FAMILY RELOCATION UNDER URBAN RENEWAL 14, 33-39 (1963); New Haven Register,
Sept. 28, 1963, p. 1, col. 6.
16. HHFA, RELOCATION DATA 8 (table opposite).
17. Ibid.
18. See, e.g., Creighton, The Scope of Housing Renewal, 22 J. AM. INSTITUTE OF
PLANNERS 30, 31 (1956); Gans, The Human Implications of Current Redevelopment
and Relocation Planning, 25 J. Am. INSrrrTUT OF PLANNERS 15 (1961) ; Grigsby, Hous-
ing and Slum Clearance: Elusive Goals, in THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 107 (March 1964) ; Johnstone, supra note 5, at 352;
Meltzer, Relocation of Families Displaced in Urban Redevelopment: Experience in
Chicago, in WOODBURY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 409-13; Thabit, Renewal--A Planning
Challenge, 26 J. Am. INSTITUTE OF PLANNERS 84, 85-86 (1960). See also Cogen, The
Workable Program for Urban Renewal, 80-81, 144 (1958) (unpublished thesis in Yale
Law Library).
19. 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1963), affirming No. 40834, N.D. Cal., August 29, 1962,
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963). Defendants included, not only the local renewal agency,
but the Oakland City government, the Housing Administrator, and other HHFA officials.
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that the Local Public Agency (LPA)2 0 would not be able to fulfill its obli-
gation to relocate site families (especially the eighty per cent that were non-
white). --1 Thus, they claimed, the Housing Administrator had wrongfully
approved the plan and made an improper award of federal monies. The trial
court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding that plaintiffs had
failed to show any facts that would prove the relocation plan to be inade-
quate.2 2 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds, holding that
plaintiffs had no standing to sue.23 Two lines of reasoning were intertwined
in the court's opinion. First, the court implied, alternative and unpursued
remedies available through the Housing Administrator-a depositary of ex-
pertise necessary to sensible decision-making in a complex situation-fore-
closed any jurisdiction over relocation on the part of courts in those cases
where relief was not first sought in the administrative process. 2 4 The thought
here was not that plaintiffs might not be entitled to relief, but that they had
asked the wrong forum to grant it. Second, the court suggested that the
plaintiffs did not have a cognizable interest in relocation under the statute-
a conclusion which would seem to negate the possibility of judicial review at
any time. The court supported this position by arguing that section 105(c)
governed the terms of Title I assistance contracts and imposed upon the LPA
an obligation to make a showing of the feasibility of relocation before the con-
tract could be consummated. The court then reasoned that enforcement of this
contractual condition was delegated solely to the Administrator and that plain-
tiffs, who sought relief as third-party beneficiaries of the contract,25 had no
standing to seek enforcement of the relocation provision.2 6
20. A local public agency is defined as "any State, county, municipality, or other
governmental entity or public body" authorized to undertake urban renewal projects. 63
Stat. 421 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1460(h) (1958).
21. The Johnson plaintiffs represented an estimated 1660 site residents; of these, 1335
were non-white. See Appendix D to the answer of the defendant redevelopment agency
(Form H-6122, as submitted to the HHFA in conjunction with the Acorn Project Re-
location Plan), at 1.
22. Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, No. 40834, N.D. Cal., August 29, 1962.
23. 317 F.2d 872, 875 (1963).
24. 317 F.2d at 874-75. The court argued that its denial of standing did not leave
plaintiffs remediless, because they had the opportunity to contest the plan at a local
hearing (see notes 43-48 infra and accompanying text), and could present grievances to
the Housing Administrator. Moreover, in this case, plaintiffs could have challenged the
relocation plan in the state courts within 60 days after its adoption. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFrTY CODE, § 33530 (1955).
25. The considerations determinative of one's status as a third-party beneficiary seem
the same as the considerations determinative of standing. The inquiry in both cases is
whether the complainant's interest is sufficient to Warrant judicial intervention, on. his
behalf. Compare 3 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW ch. 22 (1958) (standing), with 4 CoR-
]BIN, CONTRA TS §§ 772-855 (1951) (third-party beneficiaries).
26. 317 F.2d 872, 874 (1963). The court suggested that Congress did not intend to
create a right of action in those not a party to the federal assistance contract. It cited
Hunter v. City of New York, 121 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1953), a case in which a New
York trial court denied standing to site families on, the ground that they had no "vested
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Insofar as it suggests that renewal site families have no "rights" sufficient
to merit standing to protest acts of the Administrator in enforcing section
105(c), the Ninth Circuit's decision, in effect, forecloses all judicial review
of the plaintiffs' claim,27 and seems an unwarranted refusal to afford judicial
protection to the families' "interests" in relocation. Were relocation in stand-
ard housing not required, renewal might inflict substantial harm, economic
and emotional, on displacees.28 While, by its terms, section 105 (c) only con-
trols the provisions of the federal aid contract,29 the point of such control is
to insure the proper treatment of site families. The statute thus appears to
recognize the interests of, and to offer some protection to, these people.30
When a party seeks judicial relief from an injury inflicted by administrative
action upon an interest recognized by statute, standing and review traditionally
obtain ;31 indeed, it has been said that the cases establish a presumption of a
right!' to relocation since Congress might repeal § 105(c) at any time. The Supreme
Court has refused to find the "vested right" theory determinative in a case involving
similar interests. Parker v. Fleming, 329 U.S. 531 (1947). In Parker, plaintiff tenants
sought judicial review of the actions of the Price Administrator in granting eviction
certificates to their landlord. Even. if the "vested right!' theory is accepted, it would seem
that the interests of site families in relocation should be determined by the statutory
provisions in effect at the time of the contract governing the particular project.
The Hunter court ruled alternatively that it had no power to review the actions of
the Housing Administrator. Subsequent New York decisions have emphasized this juris-
dictional point. Spadanuta v. Rockville Centre, 224 N.Y.S.2d 963 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
27. See Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review I, 71 HARv. L. REv. 401, 421 (1958).
28. Displaced families would be forced to bear the entire cost of locating substitute
housing and might be faced with the prospect of higher rent if the result of the renewal
activity is increased demand for housing. See note 14 supra. To the extent that renewal
destroys neighborhood living patterns, its impact on the emotional lives of displacees is
incalculable. See Gans, supra note 18; Fried & Gleicher, Some Sources of Residential
Satisfaction in an Urban Slum, 27 J. Am. INSTITUTE OF PLANNERS 305 (1961). For an
analysis of the type of people who live in slums and the ways in which their social pat-
terns differ from the rest of the urban population, see Seeley, The Slum: Its Nature,
Use, and Users, 25 J. Am. INSTITUTE OF PLANNmRS 7 (1959).
29. See note 5 supra.
30. Of course, relocation, alone cannot compensate for many of the hardships inflicted
on displaced families by renewal. See note 28 supra. But the notion of aiding site families
in a tangible manner does indicate an awareness of their burden and an attempt to alle-
viate it. See the report of the Senate Committee, supra note 9. In addition to the require-
ments of § 105 (c), the federal statute permits the LPA to reimburse displaced families up
to $200 for their moving expenses and direct losses of property. The expense of this pro-
gram is borne by the federal government. 70 Stat. 1100 (1956), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1456(f) (Supp. IV, 1962).
31. The leading case is The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924). There, the
ICC had permitted a single railroad to acquire control of a previously independent term-
inal railroad. Competing railroads, who claimed that this action was not in the public
interest because it took from them equal access to the Chicago market, were permitted
standing to contest the ICC's order. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis,
declared:
[This] is injury inflicted by denying to the plaintiffs equality of treatment. To
such treatment carriers are, under the Interstate Commerce Act, as fully entitled
as any shipper . . .. By reason of this legislation, the plaintiffs, being competitors
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right to judicial review in persons whose interests are "acutely and immedi-
ately affected" by an administrative action.32 The Second Circuit has followed
this doctrine in Gart v. Cole,33 where the court granted site families standing
to contest the procedures adopted by the Administrator to enforce the reloca-
tion requirement. 34 A decision granting standing would conform not only to
precedent but also to the counsel of the Administrative Procedure Act ;35
section 10 of the APA, which 'apparently codifies the presumption in
favor of judicial review,30 provides for judicial intervention at the instance
of the New York Central and users of the terminal railroads heretofore neutral,
have a special interest in. the proposal to transfer the control to that company.
Id. at 267.
See the discussion, in Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75
HARv. L. REv. 255, 262-69 (1961). See also Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951).
In the absence of an applicable statutory review procedure, a court's jurisdiction is
based on its general equity powers. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 187 (1958) ; Harmon
v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581 (1958); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 307 (1944);
American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 107 (1902).
To the extent that present relocation methods result in increased racial segregation
among displaced families (see note 15 supra), they would seem to have standing to pro-
tect their interest in equal protection as recognized by the Fourteenth Amendment.
32. Jaffe, supra note 27, at 420 (1958). See also id. at 420-37; Davis, Unreviewable
Administrative Action, 15 F.R.D. 411, 426 (1954); 4 DAvIS, AnNISTATIVE LAW
§§ 28.05-.21 (1958); Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Ad-
ministrative Process, 28 FoRDHA L. Ray. 1, 12 (1959). See note 31 supra. These com-
mentators agree that only an, express statutory intent to exclude judicial review should
justify a court's refusal to intervene, and the Supreme Court seems to have recognized
this principle. See United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 433-35 (1949). Compare Leedom
v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) and Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944), with Switch-
men's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943) (4-3 decision).
33. 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959), affirming 166 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959).
34. 263 F.2d at 250-51. Plaintiffs in Gart argued that the Administrator had a duty
to grant them an oral hearing on the feasibility of a relocation plan. The court held that
there was no such requirement. Plaintiffs also alleged that the Administrator had dele-
gated his responsibility to review relocation planning. See note 6 supra. But the court
held that they had failed to present any proof of such misconduct.
35. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958).
36. Section 10 provides for judicial review of administrative action "except so far as
(1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency
discretion." 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958). The legislative history indicates
a congressional desire that, except in those rare cases where Congress has clearly ex-
cluded review, judicial review of all administrative action be available; discretion, it was
felt, goes to the question of relief, not of review. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 41 (1946). Professor Jaffe believes that the APA has had little effect on the basic
right to review; he sees § 10 as a codification of the case-law presumption. See Jaffe,
The Right to Judicial Review II, 71 HAnv. L. Rv. 769, 790 (1958). Even so, § 10 has
had an impact on the Court's approach to-and sometimes on its decision in-cases raising
the question of review. Compare Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185 (1956),
with Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
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of "any person adversely affected or aggrieved... within the meaning of any
relevant statute. 1 7 Given the apparent purpose of section 105(c), renewal
displacees seem well within this definition. Moreover, a denial of standing to
site families silences the principal voice which might serve to check improper
administration of section 105 (c).38 Finally, an absolute refusal by the court to
intervene in the administration of section 105 (c) at the instance of site families
seems an abdication of the court's traditional institutional responsibility to
insure that administrative action is confined to the bounds of agency discre-
tion and authority.8 9 If the court in Johnson meant to deny standing and
preclude review in this absolute sense, then its decision seems wrong. But the
court may not have intended such a harsh result; its refusal to entertain the
plaintiffs' claim might have resulted from a failure to pursue what the court
felt was an available administrative remedy.40 If this limited ground was the
basis for the decision, however, the court's use of the standing doctrine pro-
duces needless confusion; the court might better have invoked doctrines of
finality, exhaustion, or ripeness to support its holding.
41
Assuming that the Johnson court meant only to deny standing in this
limited sense, the wisdom of its decision would seem to depend upon the
37. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1958). A wide variety of interests
have been granted judicial recognition under a similar provision of the Communications
Act. 48 Stat. 1093 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1958). E.g., FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) (existing station granted standing to allege
violations of law in agency's award of license for second station in same locality) ; Colum-
bia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942) (network affected by
regulations directed to broadcasting stations allowed standing to contest validity of
regulations) ; Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (competitor of licen-
see's parent company allowed to protest renewal of license on ground that award was not
in public interest. Complainant's sole injury resulted from alleged unfair advertising ad-
vantages gained by the parent). See also Parker v. Fleming, 329 U.S. 531 (1947), where
plaintiff tenants were found to be "subject to" an eviction order granted to their landlord
by the Price Administrator, and thus entitled to judicial review under the relevant statu-
tory provision.
38. Standing is sometimes justified on the ground that the complaining party is the
only person likely to protect the "public interest." FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
supra note 37; Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) ; Parker v.
Fleming, supra note 37; Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943)
(wherein Judge Frank characterized the plaintiffs as "private attorney generals"). This
theory would seem the explanation of Housing & Redevelopment Auth. v. Minneapolis
Metropolitan Co., 259 Minn. 1, 104 N.W.2d 864 (1960), in which the court granted
standing to a corporate owner of site property to contest the feasibility of relocation.
39. Cf. Jaffe, supra note 27, at 401-10; Kramer, supra note 32, at 6.
40. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
41. Each of these doctrines relates to the timing of judicial review. In many respects,
they seem interchangeable. Thus, it might be argued that because a party had failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies, the administrative action could not be regarded as
final, since the agency might change its course in response to a properly directed com-
plaint. Similarly, it might be said that an agency action which could not be considered as
final was not ripe for review, since injury to the complainant was not certain to occur.
For a general discussion of these three doctrines, and the even more puzzling doctrine
of primary jurisdiction, see Kramer, supra note 32, at 36-44.
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availability of an administrative proceeding in which the interests of site
families can be meaningfully protected.42 The Housing Act 4 3 and many state
enabling acts 44 require the renewal community to conduct a public hearing
prior to the implementation of the renewal plan, and HHFA regulations per-
mit the award of federal aid only after such a hearing has been held.45 Since
renewal planning is the responsibility of the participating communities,46 these
local hearings provide an important forum for the site family to test the LPA's
relocation proposals: if the local hearing board (which may be the LPA, the
community governing body, or other local authority) 47 is persuaded that ad-
ditional provision for site families is necessary or desirable, the relocation
plan can be revised before it is submitted to the HHFA for the Administra-
tor's review and approval. But, the possibility that the local hearing board
may tend to accept uncritically the LPA's already formulated relocation plan
suggests that the community public hearing may offer only limited protection
to renewal displacees. 4s The availability of a local hearing, then, does not seem
sufficient to justify the court's remitting the Johnson plaintiffs to the adminis-
trative process.
After the local hearing and endorsement by the community governing
body,49 the renewal plan-along with detailed information documenting the
community's need for Title I assistance and its ability to perform the renewal
task r°-is submitted by the LPA to the HHFA for approval and award of
federal monies.0 ' On the basis of relocation data submitted by the LPA,52 the
42. There would seem no reason for the court to remit the plaintiffs to an inadequate
or unavailable administrative remedy. Cf. United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United
States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945); Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926).
43. 63 Stat. 417 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1958).
44. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33530-35 (1955); Coxx. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-127 (1958); MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 121, § 26KK (Supp. 1963); Mo. STAT. ANN.
§ 99.430(9) (1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1710(g) (Supp. 1963).
45. HHFA, URM ch. 4-3, at 1.
46. See generally, the Congressional Declaration of National Housing Policy in the
Housing Act of 1949. 63 Stat. 413 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958) ; HHFA, URM pt. 1.
47. HHFA, URM ch. 4-3, at 1.
48. For an excellent critique of the local public hearing in a renewal context, see
Sullivan, Administrative Procedure and the Advocatory Process in Urban Redevelop-
ment, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 134, 143-49 (1957). Not only are LPA presentations supported
by data, but they are often designed with an eye to selling the renewal program to the
community's governing body, its citizens, and the HHFA. See generally id. at 145-47.
See also Note, 69 YALE L.J. 321, 328 (1959).
49. After the local public hearing, the renewal plan must be approved by the com-
munity governing body, with findings that: 1) federal aid is necessary to carry out the
project; 2) the plan provides maximum opportunity for private enterprise to participate
in the renewal effort; 3) the plan conforms to a general plan for the community; 4)
the plan gives consideration to the need for parks and recreation facilities. 63 Stat. 417
11949), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1455(a) (Supp. IV, 1962).
50. An outline of the submission requirements for Title I assistance is found in
HHFA, URM pt. 10.
51. The procedures of submission are summarized in HHFA, URM pt. 4.
52. Relocation submission requirements are detailed in HHFA, URM pt. 16.
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Administrator determines whether the community's relocation planning meets
the statutory standard: section 105(c) requires that "there are or are being
provided . . . decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings equal in number to the
number of and available to such displaced families."53 The Administrator has
interpreted this provision as requiring that the LPA demonstrate its ability to
make available standard housing-usually defined by planners as dwellings
which meet local building and housing code standards 54-to all displaced
families.5r Regulations promulgated under this interpretation require the com-
munity to show that it will provide a professional staff to aid site families in
the effort to locate housing 16 and that community housing conditions are such
that the relocation staff will be able to locate decent dwellings for all families.
In support of this latter conclusion, the LPA is required to estimate the
vacancies that will occur during the displacement period in public housing, in
sales housing, and in private rental housing, and to indicate what portion of
those vacancies will be available to non-white families. The LPA must
simultaneously survey a sample of the site families to determine their housing
needs.58 The anticipated needs of all displacees are then compared with the
estimated supply of housing to provide data from which the Administrator
can form a judgment as to the LPA's ability to effectuate proper relocation. 9
The minimum showing seemingly permitted by the HHFA regulations is a
demonstration that anticipated vacancies in decent housing equal the number
of families to be displaced and a statement that a relocation staff will exist
to place the site families in those vacancies. 60 But such a showing should not
53. 63 Stat. 417 (1949), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1958). The full text of
this provision is set forth at note 6 supra.
54. HE DAHL, URBAN RENEWAL 201 (1959). Adequate codes are required as part
of the renewal community's Workable Program. HHFA, How LocALrMEs CANr DEmLOP
A WORKABLE PROGRAM FOR URBAN RENEWAL 5 (1956). In 1954, the Workable Program
was made a statutory prerequisite for federal assistance for urban renewal, public hous-
ing, and some forms of FHA mortgage insurance. 68 Stat. 623 (1954), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 1451(c) (Supp. IV, 1962). Its purpose is to evidence the community's ability
and willingness to achieve renewal goals. The HHFA has prescribed seven elements
necessary to a Workable Program. See, e.g., HHFA, THE WORKABLE PROGRAM - WHAT
IT Is 4-5 (1957). See generally Cogen, The Workable Program for Urban Renewal
(1958) (unpublished thesis in Yale Law Library).
It has been suggested that this definition puts undue emphasis upon physical standards
and fails to recognize that low income families are often more concerned with neighbor-
hood social patterns. Gans, supra note 18, at 20. See generally Fried & Gleicher, supra
note 28; Seeley, supra note 28.
55. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
56. HHFA, URM § 16-2-1, at 1.
57. This information is submitted on, HHFA Form H-6122, which is reproduced as
Exhibit A to HHFA, URM § 16-2-2. Estimated housing resources are reported accord-
ing to size and price on pp. 4-5 of the form, and a summary of the LPA's estimates is
reported on p. 1.
58. Id. at 2-3.
59. Id. at 4-5.
60. "The estimates of housing resources in each size and housing cost range must,
as a minimum, equal the estimated rehousing needs of the families." HHFA, Fvnra SER-
vicn MANuAL § 16-1-3.
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persuade the Administrator that the statutory standard can be met; the short-
age of adequate dwellings and the resulting competition in the housing market
will make it unlikely that all anticipated vacancies can be secured for site
families.61 At the other extreme, a proposal to provide a quantity of new
housing for relocation purposes equal to the number of displaced families
should merit the Administrator's approval. If a relocation plan which falls
between these extremes is proposed, the task of the Administrator is to deter-
mine whether the relocation staff can reasonably be expected to secure ade-
quate rehousing for all site families, balancing their needs against the antici-
pated housing resources.
The problem which may arise in connection with the Administrator's re-
view of relocation planning, and which is presented by the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Johnson, is whether site families must be afforded opportunity to
present the Administrator with opposing views as to the feasibility of reloca-
tion. The interests of site families in relocation which justify standing in the
judicial process 62 would seem to warrant their intervention at this stage, and
the Ninth Circuit was evidently concerned that the Johnson plaintiffs had
failed to lay their grievances before the Administrator. 3 Yet although the
Administrator has permitted site families to submit documentary evidence in
opposition to community relocation planning on at least one previous occa-
sion,64 the HHFA has no announced procedure by which such grievances
may be presented. 5 The Administrator's review of relocation planning is ap-
parently not subject to the notice and participation requirements of section 4
of the Administrative Procedure Act, since the proceeding relates to "public
. . . loans, grants, . . . [and] contracts." 66 Nor does the Housing Act pre-
61. See note 14 mtpra and accompanying text. See also note 77 infra and accompany-
ing text. Unless one is to argue for compulsory relocation into LPA selected quarters,
there must also be some allowance for family choice among available dwelling units.
Some of the problems which result from an arbitrary classification of family needs, and
a failure to allow for the selection factor are suggested in CONN. AnvisoR Comm. To
THE UNrrED STATES CommI'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON CONN.: FAmILY RELOCATION
UNDER URN RIENmwA. 24 (1963).
62. See notes 27-38 supra and accompanying text. Standing to appeal may not neces-
sarily imply a right to an administrative hearing. There may be situations in which inter-
vention at the administrative level would be unwarranted. See Jaffe, supra note 31, at
283-84.
63. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
64. The plaintiff site families in Gart v. Cole, mpra note 33, were permitted to sub-
mit evidence. They claimed that the Administrator was also required to grant them an
oral hearing. The court denied this claim, holding that the Housing Act required nothing
more than the permitted protest. 263 F.2d at 250-51.
65. No provision for site family protests is made in the URM, and an interview
with the Regional Counsel of the HHFA in New York revealed that the agency has no
formal grievance procedure. The agency is, however, wont to consider challenges to
community planning when submitted.
66. Section 4 of the APA provides for notice of proposed agency action and for a
protest procedure in all cases of rule-making "except to the extent that there is involved
... (2) any matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property,
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scribe any method by which the Administrator is to enforce the relocation
requirement. But while the method of enforcing section 105(c) thus seems to
be a matter of administrative discretion, once the Administrator has elected
to base his determination primarily on data submitted by the LPA-rather
than on independent HHFA investigations 67 or on the record made at the
local public hearing 6s-it would seem that he must consider proffered pro-
tests to that data. Otherwise, his determination can be based only on those
facts which the LPA has chosen to submit and will be susceptible to attack
as arbitrary or as an abuse of discretion.6 9 However, since the Administrator's
review of LPA relocation planning is based on written submissions, his duty
to hear site families would seem discharged by a consideration of their writ-
ten protests,7° and the Second Circuit has held that he need not grant an oral
hearing to protesting displacees. 71 In view of the predominantly statistical
data required by the Administrator, demeanor evidence would seem of rela-
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1958). The
Administrator's approval of community relocation, planning otherwise meets the APA's
definition of a rule. See 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1958).
67. Renewal planning under Title I is a matter of community responsibility. See
note 46 supra. In keeping with this policy, the Administrator does not conduct inde-
pendent surveys of local housing needs and resources or dictate the content of local re-
location planning. Howard, The Role of the Federal Government in Urban Land Use
Planning, 29 FORDHAm L. Rav. 657 (1961). The HHFA does, however, oversee the ex-
ecution of renewal projects in a general way; a site representative is designated for each
approved project. Among the responsibilities of the site representative is spot inspection
of the LPA relocation effort; he is to report non-compliances to the LPA and to the
Regional office of the HHFA. HHFA, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR URBAN RENEWAL
OPERATIONS - FIELD SERVICE ch. 8-2.
68. Administrative regulations presently require only the submission of a certified
copy of excerpts from the minutes, showing a) the date, time, and place of the hearing;
b) that the hearing was held and opportunity accorded to all to present their views; c)
the official action, if any, taken by the hearing board. HHFA, URM ch. 4-3, at 3. But
even if a transcript of the local hearing were submitted to the Administrator, it might
not form an adequate basis for his review since the LPA might modify its relocation
proposals between the date of the hearing and submission to the HHFA. Only in some
cases will such a modification, require a second public hearing. Id. at 1.
69. Cf. The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924), where the court held that
parties within the ambit of a relevant statute were entitled to equal treatment by the
agency. See note 31 supra.
70. Since the Administrator's duty to hear arises because he considers LPA sub-
missions, that duty would seem discharged when he affords equal treatment to other
complainants. See note 69 supra and accompanying text. Rulemaking under the APA
requires that "the agency shall afford interested persons an opportunity to participate
in the rule-making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or with-
out opportunity to present the same orally in any manner." 60 Stat. 239 (1946), as
amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1958). Although this provision of the APA does not apply
to the Administrator's review of relocation planning (see note 66 supra and accompany-
ing text), the general acceptability of a written procedure in the administrative process
suggests its suitability here.
71. Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959), affirming 166 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959). See notes 33-34 supra.
[Vol. 73 : 10801090
REVIEW OF RELOCATION PLANNING
tively little importance, and a written protest procedure appears to provide
the Administrator with an adequate basis for his decision.
In contesting the feasibility of relocation before the Housing Administrator,
a site family will have to counter the LPA's data-supported plan with evidence
showing that conditions in the housing market will not permit the proper re-
housing of all displacees. Two types of evidence might be submitted. The
family might attempt to show that the LPA's factual predictions are erroneous.
In support of such a claim, alternative studies of displacees' housing needs
and of anticipated vacancies, conforming to the HHFA submission require-
ments, might be submitted. 72 Alternatively, the family might seek to go beyond
the basic submission requirements and to show that conditions not otherwise
made known to the Administrator will prevent adequate relocation. Since the
HHFA does not require an LPA to analyze competing demands from other
housing consumers for the anticipated vacancies in decent housing,73 the pro-
testing site family may try to show that this competition will be so severe
that the relocation staff, even with its expertise, cannot be expected to secure
the dwellings necessary for relocation purposes.74 In addition, the intervening
family may be able to show that this competition for available dwellings will
be aggravated by the community's renewal activities, since many projects
destroy more housing than they create.75 In such a "squeeze" situation, com-
72. In view of the predictive nature of the data involved in relocation planning, it
would seem that quite different conclusions might obtain from two studies of the same
raw material; the conclusion reached would depend upon the investigator's sampling
technique and upon the method of forecasting. The disparate results reached in real estate
appraisals seem illustrative.
73. The HHFA does require the LPA to consider competing demands for standard
housing by families who will be displaced through other governmental activities. HHFA,
URM § 16-2-2, at 1. But express consideration of competing demands from normal
housing consumers is not required. Presumably, however, the Administrator, and other
experts within the HHFA, are able to allow for such demand in their review of com-
munity relocation proposals. See, e.g., HHFA, FIELD SERVICE MANUAL § 16-1-3, at 2.
74. The effects of competition in the lower-end of the housing market are discussed
at note 14 supra. Its effects are particularly pronounced in public housing, for which
demand is often greater than supply. Johnstone, supra note 5, at 335. Renewal displacees
have a statutory preference for admission to federally aided public housing. 63 Stat. 423
(1949), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (Supp. IV 1962). Accelerated competition for
available public housing units may thus result in public housing serving only as relocation
housing. Yet, public housing is not intended to serve only as relocation housing, as is
demonstrated by the failure of a 1954 amendment restricting new public housing to re-
newal communities needing such units for relocation purposes. 68 Stat. 631 (1954). This
provision was repealed in 1955, 69 Stat. 638 (1955), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1451
(Supp. IV 1962), following a House Committee report that it unduly restricted the
public housing program. H.R. REP. No. 913, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1955).
75. Renewal localities tend to emphasize spectacular central city redevelopment pro-
jects; redevelopment sites, which often formerly were high density slums, are commonly
rebuilt with luxury apartments or commercial and industrial facilities. Johnstone, The
Federal Urban Renewal Program, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 301, 321 (1958); Cogen, The
Workable Program for Urban Renewal, 144 (1958) (unpublished thesis in Yale Law
Library). See also Morris, Title I Relocation, 14 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 533, 539 (1959).
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petition for available housing is heightened, 76 and the supply of decent hous-
ing may be decreased, since increased pressure on the housing market may
cause some decent housing to deteriorate to substandard levels.7 7 Faced with
such claims, the Administrator's task is to resolve the competing factual pre-
dictions and to determine whether the LPA can be expected to meet the re-
location requirement of section 105 (c), as that standard has been interpreted.
The Administrator, with his presumed expert knowledge and experience in
the field of relocation, would seem well equipped to perform this task.78 More-
over, his power to withhold federal monies or to condition the award of federal
assistance if necessary to the enforcement of section 105 (c) 79 suggests that
he is able to afford meaningful protection to the site families' interests in
relocation. The apparent availability and efficacy of this procedure, coupled
with the congressional delegation of responsibility for enforcing section 105 (c)
to the Housing Administrator,80 suggests that the court in Johnson was right
in refusing to take jurisdiction of plaintiffs' claim when they had failed to
pursue their administrative remedy. Judicial intervention in Johnson would
have by-passed the Administrator's hearing, thereby minimizing the effective-
ness of his role in future cases, as well as depriving the court of his experienced
consideration of the factual issues. Moreover, had the court intervened, it
would have been required to conduct an independent fact-finding proceeding,
Such redevelopment programs are intended to restore the community's tax base and to
bring urban land uses into conformity with modem planning concepts. Sullivan, supra
note 48, at 136-38. Such programs apparently meet the public purpose requirement. Cf.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (dictum).
76. See generally Thabit, Renewal - A Planning Challenge, 26 J. Am. INsTrruTE
oF PLANNERS 84, 86 (1960).
77. Increased demand for housing is felt largely at the bottom of the housing market.
See note 14 supra. While the Workable Program requires of a community adequate codes
and the ability to enforce them (see note 54 supra), a community with a decreasing hous-
ing supply is faced with a difficult, and perhaps impossible, choice betveen overcrowding
and code enforcement: conscientious enforcement in such a squeeze situation can only
result in additional displacement, thus further aggravating the squeeze. Perhaps as a re-
sult of this vicious circle, the renewal community often does not even have a staff capable
of enforcing its codes, Rhyne, The Workable Program - A Challenge for Communit3,
Improvement, 25 LAw & CoNTEmp. PR oB. 685, 696 (1960), even though code enforce-
ment is recognized as one of the cheapest and most effective techniques for preventing
urban decay. See, e.g., Leberman, Taylor & Wellwood, Code Enforcement - A Ncglccted
Tool in Planning and Urban Renewal, 1961 PLANNING 14; Reath, Housing Law En-
forcement: Its Role in Urban Renewal, 23 SHIaNGLE 86 (1960).
78. The Administrator is able to bring not only his own experience but also that of
staff members within the HHFA to a consideration of the competing views as to the
feasibility of relocation. At the present time, he relies strongly on staff reports, at least
in situations where the LPA submission is not contested. See HHFA, FIELD SERVICE
MANUAL ch. 16-1.
79. The Administrator's powers are set forth in detail in § 106(c) of the Housing
Act, 63 Stat. 417 (1949), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (Supp. IV 1962).
80. 63 Stat. 414 (1949), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (Supp. IV 1962). See note
7 supra.
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rather than being able to base its review on the record made before the Ad-
ministrator.
It would seem, then, that the Johnson decision should be read as a limita-
tion on site families' ability to obtain judicial review only when they have neg-
lected to seek relief in the administrative process. But if the decision is so
limited, it does not bear on the availability or scope of judicial review once
the Administrator's determination becomes final. Both case law 8 's and the
Administrative Procedure Act 82 suggest that review at this stage should be
available, and judicial supervision seems necessary to insure that the Adminis-
trator properly protects the interests of site families.83 Moreover, the issues
involved in relocation planning do not seem beyond the abilities of a court.84
There is thus every reason to afford protesting families judicial review of the
Administrator's decision, the scope of such review depending upon whether
the parties contest the Administrator's factual determinations or his inter-
pretation and application of section 105(c). The Administrator's presumed
expertness in resolving issues of fact, and the existence of a procedure which
is capable of bringing all relevant evidence to his attention, suggest that a
court should refrain from substituting its own judgment on factual questions.
The effect of such substitution would be to vitiate substantially the adminis-
trative process by reducing the Administrator to a mere collator of facts.
Judicial restraint is also suggested by the fact that Congress has delegated to
the Administrator primary responsibility for enforcing the relocation pro-
vision.85 Review of administrative factual determinations is customarily guided
by the substantial evidence rule,86 and this rule would seem appropriate in
section 105(c) cases. Under this doctrine, an agency finding can be upset by
a court only if it is unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole recordY
7
81. See notes 31-34 and note 38 stupra.
82. See notes 35-37 siepra.
83. See note 39 supra.
84. The courts evaluate similar predictions of housing market behavior in eminent
domain compensation suits, and much more complex and diffuse issues of market be-
havior are presented in the usual anti-trust proceeding. Moreover, given the somewhat
limited scope of review advocated in this Note (see notes 86-88 infra and accompanying
text), a court need examine the factual data only to determine whether it supports the
Administrator's determination.
85. 63 Stat. 414 (1949), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (Supp. IV 1962).
86. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). See 4 DAvis, ADrMNIS-
TRATIVE LAW §§ 29.01-.11 (1958); Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69 HAsv.
L. REv. 1020, 1021 (1956) ; Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the
Administrative Process, 28 FoRDfr.u L. Rxv. 1, 76 (1959). The substantial evidence test
has been adopted by the Administrative Procedure Act in, all cases where an agency hear-
ing is required by statute, except insofar as the agency action is discretionary. 60 Stat.
243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958).
87. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 86. The APA provides for the
court to "review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party."
60 Stat. 244 (1956), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1958). Professor Jaffe argues that the courts
are gradually adopting the substantial evidence test as the measure of review in, all cases
except those in which Congress expressly provides another standard. Jaffe, supra note 86.
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Judicial review under this standard would permit the Administrator the flexi-
bility necessary to effective decision-making, while allowing the court to ex-
ercise its supervisory function by confining the Administrator's determination
to the limits of rationality.8 8
A court reviewing the Administrator's interpretation of section 105 (c)
should similarly be guided by an awareness of the Administrator's responsi-
bility to formulate workable policy consistent with a generalized statutory
goal; the task of the court would seem to be to insure that the Administrator's
interpretation is, in fact, effectuating the statutory purpose. 8 The purpose of
section 105(c) seems reasonably clear; it requires as a condition to the award
of Title I assistance that decent housing exist and be available to all displaced
site families.90 However, the Administrator's interpretation of the provision
-requiring the LPA to show that it will be able to rehouse all displacees
satisfactorily 91-has been criticized as demanding too little to accomplish the
statutory purpose.92 Two main factors seem to underlie this criticism. First,
the Administrator's reliance on the referral technique to place site families in
adequate housing has not proved entirely satisfactory: in the past, only about
Professor Davis, however, feels that the courts often abandon the substantial evidence
rule in favor of a broader standard which allows them to substitute their own judgment
on factual matters. 4 DAvis, ADIINISTRATIVE LAW § 29.07 (1958).
88. Professor Jaffe suggests that the question on review is whether one can reason
from the evidence to the announced determination. Jaffe, supra note 86, at 1022-23.
89. Professor Jaffe has analyzed the scope of review of questions of law in terms
of the "dear statutory purpose" test. See Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69
HARv. L. REv. 239, 258-62 (1955). Thus, he argues that an agency should be permitted
to determine policy so long as that policy coincides with what the court perceives as the
clear purpose of the statute. See also Kramer, supra note 86, at 87. Professor Davis
identifies the central factor guiding the scope of review of questions of law to be the
relative qualification of court and agency to deal with a given problem. 4 DAvis, AD-
MINISTRAT E LAW § 30.09 (1958). This test, too, would seem to justify judicial review
of the Administrator's interpretation of § 105(c); the court seems both more qualified
and in a better position to determine whether the Administrator's policies effectuate the
statutory purpose.
90. The text of § 105(c) is reproduced at note 6 supra. See also notes 9, 30 suipra
and accompanying text.
91. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Creighton, The Scope of Housing Renewal, 22 J. Am. INsTITuTE or
PLANNERS 30, 31 (1956); Grigsby, Housing and Shm Clearance: Elusive Goals, THE
ANNALS OF THE AiMRICAN ACADEMY Or POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE March 1964,
at 107; Meltzer, Relocation of Families Displaced in Urban Redevelopment: Experience
in Chicago, in WOODBtRY at 452; Thabit, Renewal - A Planning Challenge, 26 J. Am.
INSTITUTE OF PLANNERS 84 (1960). Others attribute shortcomings in the present program
to a lack of emphasis or enforcement of the relocation requirements. Howard, The Role
of the Federal Government in Urban Land Use Planning, 29 FORDHAm L. REv. 657
(1961); Leach, The Federal Urban Renewal Program: A Ten-Year Critique, 25 LAW
& CONTEMP. PRoB. 777, 788 (1960) ; Cogen, The Workable Program for Urban Renewal
144 (1958) (unpublished thesis in Yale Law Library). The low priority of relocation is
evidenced by the fact that less than 1% of renewal monies are spent in this area. Gans,
The Human Implications of Current Redevelopment and Relocation Planning, 25 J. Am.
INSTITUTE OF PLANNERS 15, 22 (1959).
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one fourth of site families have availed themselves of referral services pro-
vided by LPA's ;93 the remaining three fourths have relocated themselves.94
Since self-relocating families lack the expertise of the professionals employed
by the LPA's referral service, it is reasonable to assume that the housing
shortage will have forced some of them to accept substandard accommodations.
Although the HHFA requires the LPA to inspect the new housing of those
who are self-relocated and to offer referral assistance to those who have estab-
lished themselves in substandard quarters,95 it has been true that, among these
people who have rejected assistance when it was first offered,96 some have not
been inclined to accept help the second time around.97 Second, even if the
referral service succeeds in placing most displaced families in standard dwell-
ings, the pressure to accommodate renewal displacees and regular housing
consumers in a market of limited supply makes difficult the maintenance of
proper living conditions. Consequently, relocation housing which meets local
code requirements on the date of relocation may become overcrowded and
substandard as the competition increases. 98 There thus seems support for the
critics' observation that the goal of relocating all displacees in decent, safe,
and sanitary housing has not been effectuated under present administrative
policies. These critics of the current relocation program suggest that section
105 (c) must be interpreted as requiring the creation of a community housing
environment in which all displaced families will be able to find by themselves
and retain housing that is decent, safe, and sanitary. 99
93. HHFA, RELOCATION DATA 15.
94. Ibid.
95. HHFA, URM § 16-2-1, at 3.
96. Some self-relocatees may have moved before being contacted by the relocation
staff, as there is often an interval between approval and execution of a renewal project.
The need for relocation advice at an early stage is suggested in CONNECTICUT ADVISORY
COmM., REPORT ON CONNECTICUT: FAmILY RELOCATION UNDER URBAN RENEWAL (1963).
97. The 7500 families now known to be in substandard housing (see note 16 supra
and accompanying text), are those who have refused additional relocation assistance.
HHFA, RELOCATION DATA 9-10.
98. See notes 14 and 77 supra. Section 105(c) seems clearly to comprehend perma-
nent relocation of site families, since it permits temporary rehousing prior to the avail-
ability of sufficient decent dwellings. Relocation in adequate but deteriorating facilities
would thus seem contrary to the statutory standard.
99. See, e.g., Creighton, supra note 92, at 31; Thabit, supra note 92, at 86; Cogen,
supra note 92, at 80-81. These critics suggest that the loss of housing must be scheduled
against new construction, perhaps on vacant land, if the renewal program is not to ac-
cumulate severe housing and relocation problems. But privately financed new construction
is beyond the reach of most low and middle-income families. See Wurster, Framework
for an Urban Society, in PRESIDENT'S CoacaussIoN ON NATIONAL GOALS, GOALS FOR
AMERICANS 225, 237 (1960). When their needs cannot be met by filtering (see note 14
supra), the community must create housing especially for them. The short-range solution
seems to be the construction of low-income housing as a relocation, resource. Such housing
must be subsidized, either directly, in public housing, or indirectly, by financial assistance
to builders or by rent supplementation, which creates among low-income families a market
for privately financed housing. Since 1954, federally insured mortgages have been avail-
able under § 221 of the Housing Act for the construction of relocation housing. 68 Stat.
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In raising a challenge to the Administrator's relocation policies, then, the
site family presents the court with what seems a live and significant issue of
statutory interpretation. But the criticism of the relocation standard is basically
a criticism of the direction which the entire renewal program has taken. When
analyzed closely, the critics' basic argument is that renewal planning has de-
parted from the original housing goals of the program with the result that
little, if any, improvement is being made in the housing conditions of low-
income families.10° The attempt to secure judicial review of relocation plan-
ning may thus prove to be an attempt to secure a court-ordered re-direction
of the renewal plan towards immediate realization of improved housing con-
ditions. However strong the arguments for judicial relief from the Adminis-
trator's interpretation of section 105 (c) appear in isolation,""' they lose much
of their force when that provision is read against the changing patterns of
renewal which are reflected in amendments to the Housing Acts. While Con-
gress has twice increased the scope of Title I to make possible a broadened
attack on urban problems and to emphasize the importance of sound com-
munity planning, 02 at the same time, it has de-emphasized the housing ob-
jectives of the program by permitting an increasing proportion of federal
monies to be devoted to renewal projects having little connection with the
housing problem.103 These amendments would seem to indicate that Congress
599 (1954), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (Supp. IV 1962). Under § 220, mortgages
have been available to finance rehabilitation and new construction in urban renewal areas.
68 Stat. 596 (1954), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1715k (Supp. IV 1962). Locally financed
rent supplementation is permitted under HHFA regulations. HHFA, URM § 16-1, at 2,
§ 16-2-1, at 2. It has been tried in some localities, see, e.g., New Haven Register, Jan.
29, 1964, p. 1, col. 1, and recommended in some others. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 25,
1963, p. 1, col. 7. An experimental plan to make more housing available to low-income
families calls for placing them in vacant houses, with government bearing the cost dif-
ferential. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1964, p. 1, col. 3.
100. See, e.g., Grigsby, supra note 92; Meltzer, supra note 92, at 452-53.
101. See notes 92-99 supra and accompanying text.
102. In 1954, Congress inaugurated the renewal concept (see notes 4-5 stpra and
accompanying text) and introduced the Workable Program, which was designed to bring
about coordinated, long-range renewal programming. 68 Stat. 627 (1954), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 1451(c) (Supp. IV 1962). In 1959, Congress further emphasized the importance
of coordinated renewal planning by directing the HHFA to encourage renewal planning
on a metropolitan or regional scale. 73 Stat. 670 (1959), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1451(b)
(Supp. IV 1962).
103. Under the 1949 Act, Title I assistance was available only to redevelopment pro-
jects which were predominantly residential before or after redevelopment. 63 Stat. 420
(1949). In 1956, this requirement was relaxed to permit assistance to projects not pre-
dominantly residential, but which contained a "substantial number" of blighted dwellings.
Up to 10% of Title I funds could be spent in this manner. 70 Stat. 1098 (1956). In 1959,
the limitation on the amount of capital grants for areas not predominantly residential was
increased to 20%. Moreover, the 1959 act permitted the award of such funds if the com-
munity governing body determined that the project was necessary to achieve local re-
newal goals and eliminated the requirement that the non-residential area contain a sub-
stantial amount of blighted housing. 73 Stat. 675 (1959). In 1961, the percentage of Title
I assistance available for non-residential projects was increased to 30%. 75 Stat. 168
1096 [Vol. 73 : 1080
REVIEW OF RELOCATION PLANNING
has at least temporarily abandoned the original housing goals of Title I in
order to permit renewal communities to give first priority to restoring their
economic structure. 1' 4 Moreover, the Administrator has from the beginning
adhered to his present interpretation of section 105(c),105 and Congress has
not seen fit to amend that provision. This background of statutory develop-
ment suggests that the present pattern of renewal programming coincides with
legislative purpose. Because the Administrator's interpretation of section 105
(c) seems consistent with congressional intent, a court today can offer little
relief to a site family who alleges that the Administrator has wrongly inter-
preted section 105(c). But the fact that a court seems limited by present cir-
cumstances in its ability to grant relief should afford no justification for its
denying standing or review to a complaining displacee. Not only is Congress
free to revise the standards for relocation and renewal planning, but the Ad-
ministrator may act in an arbitrary manner in a particular case or, more
generally, may adopt another interpretation of the statute. In such circum-
stances, a court might well find that administrative practice did not conform
to legislative purpose. That the court should then intervene to reconcile prac-
tice and purpose seems the justification for its considering the merits of every
allegation that the two are in discord.
(1961), 42 U.S.C. § 1460(c) (Supp. IV 1962). Even under the 1949 standard, however,
communities were free to concentrate on projects which replaced slum neighborhoods
(predominantly residential) with commercial facilities.
104. See note 75 supra.
105. From time to time, the HHFA has revised the details of its relocation require-
ments, but the underlying policies have not changed. An examination of the HHFA, URM
indicates the frequency of revision.
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